Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

5-1-1970

The Adean Common Market: Gestation and Outlook
Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Diaz-Alejandro, Carlos F., "The Adean Common Market: Gestation and Outlook" (1970). Discussion
Papers. 93.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/93

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

Center Discussion Paper No. 85

The Andean Common Market:
Gestation and Outlook

Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro

May, 1970
Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in
publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the
author to protect the tentative character of these papers.

;';

Carlos F. Di.az-A lcj ,mdro

Se:-:;.:.: col'lplni necl that

the c.:c.1::.t rucU.cn
coNplcrr >ent (:.:...."'.ld goal) to I.AITA and a nccessa 17 st.cppin ssto,1c in

The for;nal birth cf the Andern1 group as n sub-rer ,ion of Ll~FTA mey
by Chile~
be dated with the Decl1,. ration of Ilo~ota ' of Aur,ust 1966, si~:1ed

Colomb ia, Ecuedo r, Peru c:nd Venezu ela.

The trcnty creetin i the /:.nclce;-i

1969.
Co;nrnon liarl~ct was only Bil3ned nearly three years later, on !fay
the
Lnbol::i ous nc3oti2 .tions have failed to persuad e Venezu ela to accc?t

1967,
final treaty; Bolivi a, \Jhich had joined the Ai.1dean P,roup during
joined the other four countr ies in this "Treaty of Cartag ena".
This paper will cxru!lin e the gestati on of the And2an Ccr..11'.lon t!arkct
genera lly
curing 1966 throuGh 1969, paying prrrtic ular attenti on to issues
ies.
relevan t to the formr1t ion of custo~s unions ar'.:lon~~ deveJ.op inP, countr
~t .n.ppcar s
'ihc outlook for the econom ic inpact of Andean inte~r ation, as

ari;ucn
ls 1,.:.rtic ularly true for tile centra l t:;3sis of t:1is p,1per, ,:ld.ch
ntion
tbz.t tl,c poss:Lh ic t::;:-ade- c:.c.ntin r, efL,cts of Latin k:eric. tn fr:.t:cgr

them ,-d th

-6-tlie l..ndean
_..____ ics of----.a.______t:·:'.~·ir,~
So!''~ CT12rac
______

Five

The /ud.,:,:~1 Five in 1%6 had a -po-puln tion of /19 nillic., n, rcprese ntin::

Centrrd
encl exceed inr that of !iexico ; and by far tho~e of J\reent inu r,r.d the
3
k::crJ.c an Com.=on ilarket .

As shmm :'..'1 T3.'.Jlc 1, 1:,.1e Andean p,:;pula tion extend s over an area
covari:. ,z 23 per cent of the Latin l.!"',c:ricai.1 domain .

'fatal Andean Gross

in
Domest1.c Produc t is simila r to that of Argent ina;. hed Venezu ela stayed
those
the group the cor.i!,in ed GDP would h~v~ bc:)n rou3hly conpar ablc to

of Brazil and g?x:Lco.
Latin />.ocri(; an mim~ra l pr.educ tion is dnmina ted by Andean countr ies,
even witho'.l t Ver.cze ~l:i~

Of totcl r.e~ion al output , for exampl e, they

of zinc,
accoun t for 90 p~r cent of t:n, 89 _per cent cf c::,ppcr , 52 -per cent
per c~nt
45 per cent of coal, 41 per cent of lccd) 22 per cent of iron (53
Vcncr::u -?la).
includi ng Ven2r.u cla), ,:md 7 per ccl1.t cf o:Ll (83 pc~ cent: inclucl; !nz
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Fer cap:i tD /,nc1e2n food c:1~Jd fiber produ.'tio n, on the oti1er hand, i:,

AJ.tb.ou~h the suhrc~ioi1 has been a net exporter

llugc.i. and beef ar:.<l veal.

of coffee, fn.dts and fish, it is a net in;:JOrter of neat, cereals (espec:;..c: lly

wheat) end d~i:cy products.

The hel.p ,::iich ;\ndea,, countries uill be able

to g:i.ve each other in nald.-:1G tbei r food and fibE.!r supnly T!lore fle:dble

will be limited, althou:::;h not zero.

For cxar,1ple, Peru is an efficient

producer and exporter of sugar, while Chile is an inefficie nt producer
and i,aporter of that good.

TU.ch fishing alone the pacific const, hard,10od

fo:::csts in southern Chile ~'"1d tropical woods else.Hhcre aloo contribut e to

the /,ndean natm:tl resourc2 base.
Tbe Andcn:1 Five 1cncrr:te 18 per cent of Latin /\:'1erican electrici ty
and ;:ccou:1t for 21 per cent of ccr~ent output, fi~urcs rou~hly in line Hith
thr.'.il: populnUc, 1 r;ilare.

nut the i\nclc ..m :;;<11n1fac turinr, ;,Cctor clearly l.1r,s

as 1.1crallurgy:

p•,:trocher:iicais nnd mac!Ji.nery and cquipnent.

'i.iH.! Andean

output of iron c1:1d stee:l, for exanplc, represents only about 11 J;cr cent of

Latin /1::-,erican ;:ro<luction.

The desire to overco:;;c, this l2r; is o;,.c, of the

after Uwy hov2. Lc.:l a cl1i:.nc,~ co expand tl,cir ou,, a,:tivitic:.; ,1:-i.Lh:in the

largt~r subregio,l-sl 1':,:::irket.

annual rate; o:i: S. 7 per cenL C:uri.ng 195,.,-iJo.

Output uf eh•r:Lric:;_Ly

expanded at a ye2rly rate of 7. 4 per cent durinr; 1960--68.

113i:.

\Jith the e:xcr,pt:i.on

of Ecuador, the GDP of all /mclcan countries grew ns fast or faster thar,
the Latin Ame1::i.cnn c!Verage for 1960-66.

1:erchandise ir.iports and export-s,

measured in currcn t dollars, creH at a healthy 7 .O per cent per annUI:1 dul·ing

1959-68.

In contrast uith the bigger Latin American countries, the

Intra

participation of forei~n trade in Andean Gi)P has risen since 1950.

Andean trade, however, remcJ.ins a tiny fraction (3 per cent) of total Andean
forei~n trade. ·The relative Andean dynnmisr.i could be an iroportnnt factor
in smoothing the frictions and facilitating the adj us trnents uhich rapid

trade liberali Z.'.ltion progra:'.ls may generate and call for.

llote that ari annl!al

grm-~th r.ate of 6 per cent \,:ill double industrial output in less th,:m 12 years,

.

roughly the period foresec•n as transition to a full custons union.

4
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GNP, a1t:i.10ugh it aJso has a su1..i.st,m tial n'.'i!Lufa cturing sector.

Ecu3dor

and Dolivia , the s;::al1cs t ~nd le2st dev2lo!1 ed r!lenbers of the group·,

have wea-::t nanufi:c tur:lng secto,:s &nd fr1port e:ce:ffic. ents far above thos~
Chile a:id Coloe1bi a.

J~'

Reluctw'" lt V2nezue l.1, with its oil resourc es, present s

many sh.!rp structu ral contras ts vis-a-vi! :l the five Andeans .

To differen ces

in per cc1.pi ta inco.::e, manufac turing developm ent ar.d foreign trude particip ation
one should add th2 he tcrogene: L ty of AndGrm historic .::l experien ces ,;ith

inflatio n and e):ch:::n~ e rate st2bilit y.
consume r prices rof;e at

an

For example , during 1963-68 , Chilea!1

.,

annual rate of 28 per cent, those of Peru at

18 per cent, in Colorr:bi a at 11 per cent, ,,hile soalle:r rates were re~ister ed
in Ecu.:dor and Bolivia .

Vcnczce la, of course, has a long tradit:l.o n of price

-6-

con:~. uni ty with in L.'\fTA.

ecl in thEi ~kcL n·atio n
The iP.1pJ e,cc:, tiltion of broad ao,rc ciwnt s rc"1cb
of :Uogota" was first held UjJ

uy

nu::;tpc,,L'h<.°.,1::.s :i.11

of the Pi~es iclcnt s of the /rn12r -ican.

t11c

In Febru ary 1%7 , Raul

st~.-zs

chief

at that tine, visit ed the
Chile an repre senta tive to the Andea n group
tryin ~ to speed up <'.ctio n
Prcoi clent s of Colo ;;bia, Pc:n-f and Vene zuela ,
Andea n matt ers.

<.,.,

ly held
The meeti n~ of the A!:lcr ican Pres iden ts, final

subre ~ion al agro: emen ts, like
on Aprl l 1967, rccoe ;nize d the desi rabil ity of
1
th at o f t1e

.
•-a c2n

;u1

. .s
coun tr~es

In .June 1967 , a 1iixcd Cor.r. 1issio n uas creat ed

iden ts, in a meet ing at
by perso nal repre senta tives of the Andea n Pres
the Andea n Corp orati on uas
Vina del !Iar, &t ,,1hich time a first draft for
also prepa red.

Cor1r :1issio n
The secon d and third ;cee tinr,s of the ! Iixed

(Atih ust 1%7 ), respe ctive ly.
were held in Qui.to (Sul:y 1%7) ~nd Cnc!c as
Ja into t!1e Andea n ~roup and
In the latte r r:"<2c ting, the entra nce of T\oliv

-7-

cr-.'.,ll: ioa of
the LAETA foreir; n oini~ tcrs ap!:>rov,.!J .•;ui<le linL!s for the

ncctin g, LAl'TA rave new si<;ns of uca:rn esses.

.

.

.

Sth. 1 rl';f.,l.'Jl~~:...t

At the fourtl1 r.:cctin ~ of the

.'.:.iv0 ratifi c :.;i.an,
t1w AT'.clcsn C,--r:"G l?ticn b-., ncblic tr,~nty , requir:: '..n,; J.egislo
'fhe

start 01,era tinr,
thus postpo:::1n_c; tl:.:c .date \:he:n this instit ution could

F'ebn.: ,,ry 1968 ~
sir;.1cd by th~ /~:1dcsn five plus Vencz ncl;i in Bqota , on
Durinp , t1w

,l uly 1968, cnly
meetin g of the :iixed Co:':~i ssion, held in Cartag .:ma during
that treaty as
Doliv ia, Colc;.; bia and Chile expres sed willin ~ness to sign
drnfte d.

Pent ,:1nd Venez uela object ed to what they regard ed as too fast

a pace of trade libera lizati on.

Nearly a year later, and after some dillu~± c:z:..

tradin g,
o!: the trade- libera lizing provis ions and a bit of horse

6

the treaty

on ib.y 1969.
creati ng an Andean custo~ s union Hns si~ned in BoE-;o ta,

Venez ue]3,

end of 1970 to
hmvev er, could not be persua ded, and irns given u;1til the
join withou t the need of specia l ner;ot iation s.

On J.uly 1969 LAFTA fon:al ly

n, and by Octob er 1969
approv ed the treaty as compa tible with that qrr,an izatio
ries to be forria lly
the Treaty of Carta~ ena lwd been ratifi ed by enou~h count

in effec t.

Lhnt ~n c~ficicnt

'rne <11 . '.· J. Lr:c U,

Corpo:r.'.: t:ton.

star:: with s~~s,::--il:~-:1 ci::=,ital of $25 nill:l.o.!, wholly m•,pplicd by the six

.,

A11dec:~, co·.r:;::.'c::cics.'

'::hr. Cc::::rorc:tion l:'.:'s the p::::~•:e:: to :i.ssue a wide variety

posd.biJ.:!.ty of h..::·-.,Jng t:ic p'l:'i wite ssct:.n· rej_)r':.DC:ntcd in its board of directors,

a por:~.::ibility ,,i:1ch D.ro:1r,c,,l c "i11.cen1 in so:7te pa~1:;_;-,:..1~nts, majority control

,

is assured fo-:.: the cix g .'lvc_r,:'.:7:lcnts,

Prncd~d by U1::.lc, the coi7,::mn:l ty authorities

b:i.tin tivc.

::.n L'.e c.::se of so:'."":C:: nr1::ion 2.l cr.•.\·clo p:nent :Lnst:L tutions, it

superio r to that sugges ted by its orisin al c~pit~ l.
Trcnty
Togeth er w:l th the e~:ecut ive re3ion nl fiutho:r ity, created u)' the

of Cartar, ena a-.,r with who!"!1 it s!10t.1ld h;:.vc clo:.;e coordi natioat the ADC
Ghould help plan region al growth .

It ,-rnuld help coordi nate nation al j_nvest -

cal integra tion"•
tTlents in social ove'.2:'heacl capito. l, c::;:p~cil'.lly regardi ng "physi
prcu:ou nced.
and :tn key indl~st rial br,mc!-1 8s \•:here ccononi C's of scale are very

sole repreThe corpor ation could clso be used in some circ1:.:n stances as the
investo rs
scntati ve of the Andec:n co;;u:,un:i.ty, as Hl1en ner;otiv .ting uith foreiP,_n
a11d institu ticns.

Dy issuing Andean bonds j_,:: oorld c.::,)ita l. market s it

in
could help divers ify the extern al sources of funds to the rcP,ion , while

on.
all lj_kelih ood inprovi nr, the> credit te::.-rr.s each couatry facC!s in isolati
T.he ADC

r:1c1y

countt: f.es
::.lc:o receive~ C'Jnccs sicn.,] lo.::ns (a:i.d) fro::i inclw,tr .i.!.lizcd

-10-

opti!:listic c.sr,u::1ptic,:;,~ i:e:~;o.rdinr; c:-:tcrnal \-,ill:i.ngncss Lo help, such

ir:,balances,

exact role and speed of trade J.:~b2:.:-2.lizatio11

1l.'.'.!S

been a source of <l:tsw;n.. e-

mcnt, althou,:-:,h few, u.: any, saw in such libcrc'.llizat ion the only instrunent

of inte8ration .

Intcgr2.tion of nc,,1 vs. esto!Jlished inchistries, plmming

integration vs. trade Jiberalizat ion, etc., were some of the forms in ,,.,hich

the argUJr.e,,.ts took s11c.:,2.

To nn economist, the substance of nuch of

the debate could be SL!:J!~arized under the pro's and con's of trade ell version

and creat~on.
The f:i.n:il vcrsio,1 of the Trc2ty of Cartagena, while nllouin?,
ccnsider.::bl e flexibility in the :,ro'.ir.:,m of tr2de liberalizat ion and er::bodying

subatentinl conccssio:1s to those fearful of ropid reduction of intrn-/mdea n
t1·.-.H1c barricr::0

,

sets up

,1

non•-triv.:.11 inter,r«:::i.on I)3ce, f;o lon~ ~s the

··11-

of all ot.:er cc;c-.•.:,,x!ities ,,:iJ.J uc reduced every yc•c:ir by ten twr cent of
the starting duty, ~-:hich \.JJ.11 be the lc,;2st duty fer each p1:0Juct no':}

found in Colomhia, Ci1ile or Pcni, nncl in nci case excecdinp 100 per cent
ad valorem.

l',y i::.he enc of 1970 all clutiG:; will be brouP,ht do'.m for

each product, to the lowest duty £6und in Colon~ia, Chile or Pcrci;

the ten per cent cuts fron that duty will start at the end of 1971, so
that by the end of 1980 they wiJ 1 reach zero.

In other words, contrary

to cunbersoMe LAFTA proc.:c:<lures, trade liberalizat ion could bt: typically
automatic, irr<"' ✓ 2rsible and across- the-"board.

•:•~•!

liberalizat ion pror,rc:~ nlso cor,;nits the countries to the "stand

still" principle, Le., no neu restriction s of ~ny kind mny be introduced

iri 5.n tra-Andeo.n tro.de.

,.
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.:. r.:::

r,;

of trz,c].:; J.1.berali:c:a.tion.

R•.::~r-,l products h:..:v·.::: th~ir c·n sr,eci<"!l u:c,:.pe

C2SC

of their trad,! ~ay be delayed.

And so:·,on; clc.J.rly, tbc pace of tr."lde

liberali,:ati.cr, :.Jill depend on the use or ·abu:;c uhic11 \i:ij_l be mi,_;e of esca-,e

cluusos of va.~ious ki11ds.

external 1:ndeari tariff in

t,-10 steps.

Hy the end of 1S75 a _£1ird.,.:1_~::::1:_cc.:,mon

exterrial tariff should be est2blished; by the crid of lSGO the countries
should have .;rQpleted the transition toward the s,1::1c ti',.riff.

As in the

liberalization program, Bolivia and Ecuador are covered ~y speci.::l provisi.m1s,

allowing them a more leisurely schedule.

The Treaty says little about

the target level of the com~on external tariff.
The 'treaty also touches upon industrial and run1l prop,ra:c1ning,
physic.'.11 integration and social overhead capital, fin~ncial and monetary
cooperation, and the coordination of dev~lop1::ent pl.:.!r,s r.md of policies
toward local and foreign capital.

It strcsf.'cs the nc0<l to distribute

:fairly gains fro!:!'. integration and reduce re,~ioi1al inc.0D2 inequulit:i.,'.S

-13-

bociy {ti1,! Junta), ;::.:;.c'..:: up of ci1::.-cc r:2er::b:::r:; ui.th their c,:n staff,

affir.12tiv e. vcte of 11 out of th'\ 5 Co!T.I!::Ls;;: c,wrs.

Cc:1sulta tive r-;rc;_1;1s

i.nclu:.i:t113 rc?:esent atives of ent,eprene u·r-s and t:cacl2 uniori.s, will '-:clvise
the

Ccz.2r::1r;f.J.O :!

and the Junta.

These CO"U'1Unity ,:uthorit:i .cs, togeth,:::r vith those of the ADC~ •.-'ill
face t:he difiicult

t.s;:;t;;

of cici:i.ning clenrl:,' and iinc:iing a workable.

equilibrtl.u :n among the several c.orJt"!unity gc ,.].s, such as economic efficienc y,
rieograph ical balance, integrati on, a fair income distribut ion and ~rcater
regionnl autonorr;•, while minimizin g the scverei8~ ty each country yields

to the new decision makers.
th!Jl!r efforts by specializ ed

Corriz:iunity auth~riti es ,dll be supported in
1
.ce.c;ional egencies, such as the United Nations

EconoI:!iC Commissio n for Latin t-..;,ierica and the Latin .American Institute
of Ecoaonic and Sr,__;:::. Planning.
Ou".look for. the &.'1.clr~2n custmts iJnion:

Tr.:1<lc creation.

:.1though it is cor:monly nsserted that analysis focusing on tra,~e diversion .
and creation is i rrelcvo.nt for in tcgratic1i mr.onr, less developed . countries ,
argu-;nents r,ivcn to f;upport such c1ssertion :; arc unconvinci n;>; in a Latin
/uncr:.c;:n context. /',t b<!st they :Lncllcate the n0.cd to sup:lcrr.en t the ,'.,12lysis

-i4-

etc.
It is nlso i:::aport~ nt to S?ccify the dtcrn::?tive to \~!1ich a custo:-:-,s
1

union ou'.:cc::.:~ is bci;:g ccr:?arcc.

Ic.:eally, tr2c1c diverr.j,on 2:1d crcotion

should be ~~?sured ~ith respect to, not the pre-customs utiio~ sttuatio~,

in each c0t,,'try of prc•~t,ctio!1:~st poJ.icies rot very diffen:.•!1t from t:llo:-::e

now in effr:ct,
Even ~rlnting this basic assumption, the precise cconc~~6 impact
of the

Ctl!:,t.os. _;

uni.on '>.'ill d12pencl i m:,ong ot'i(;•r thinr;s, on the actual sp2cd

and natur-::: of trade L;_;,;~.;:·c:.li2.atica (i.e.~ which products

cff~

freed firs':.),

and of course on the level .:md structure o~ the neu corr.man tariff.
An optimistic scenc:rio \-.'ould include -:icros.s-the-bo.::i rd trade 1iberalizatioa 5

with few exc:e:Jtions, with the A1~de an cour: t ·des takio,~ this opportu~i ty
to reshape and rationc.1li7.e their system of p1:otection.

A conr.ion external

tariff with duties avcrnging, say, around 30 per cent ad v.QlQ.L~, ~nd

the elimination of most quantit.'.lt:'..ve restrictions over fo1·ei~n tra<le

. 8
' ' scenario.
. tnis
. ld b e f oreseen in
cou

Under these circumstclI1ccs, which

would also rec'":'..r-0 a rr.ore flexible exchanr;e rate policy, the Andean customs
union

t•:,.J~d

becor::e a poli tj_cally feasible ,~:i.y to improve overall forci~n

t?_;1.de policies, 2s tn1de would be liberalized not only among Andean

c6untt±es: but also, on balance, with the rest of the ~crl<l.

-lS-

co::::-.oJiti~s produced Ly activities r.CiJ to tl1 1~ zone (.:s alre.'.'d/ iadicated

be closer to an aver2ge of present direct {.n:J ir.J:i.::'.:!ct icv1~s on inports,
9

manufacturing activities, such 2s food-nrores3in~ , textiles, le2ther nlcluctst,

etc~

liost of the trade on these. go:,ds ,,•.:_.c, lonz a~o d:i.ve:::-ted frcn fore:;.;,n

suppJ.icrs tm-rnrd doncstic procluc-:!rs; co.ch ,_.:,untry ,:~_,:rie:d out t;lis pron.ss

on its m:n, "'ltbough uith <lif[ere.nt dc<;c::-:~,.., of efficiency.

Table

~

::;::.::~-1s

the extent to whj_ch inport su'.)stitutin':'. indu::;triali:::,,t ion has advanced,
especially in Colonbia, Chile ~nd Peru....:

By J.970, the participation of

imports in total 1'2~-mufactured supplies Eust be aro,md 15 per cent for
the three countries taken as a \1hole,

It has be~n cstiPJatcd that in 1968

the share of donestic nanuf,~ct~ring in the GuP of t!-:~ Andecn fiv~ reached

21 per cent, ran[;ing fron 27 per cent in C:1:i.le to 1!1 per cent i.n :Bolivia.
Clearly, cosmon

□ ?.r.l~et

discussions which ne.~J-E:ct the indust:.ializati on.

already acco1:1plished are seriously flm,ed.
Sketchy datd indicate that there exists a ~re8.t variety fron count~;
to country in the prices nnd costs of many of the r;oods nlready produced
uithin the Andean communit:.1, su13gestin~ that tlrnrc is considera!Jlc roor.t

10
i
.
J n::o d uction
.
. .
·
an·d traae.
pattern or- rc~:.ona.
f or a r.:ore c ff icicnt

In other

word:,, rcf',arclini; r:os t 0£ 1:1:.111uf 2c t1n·inr; the !\r:de,m cou 1 tries, especially the
1
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Ancle~in cou:1 try a cor.,:::o<li ty ,:hicl, it docs 1,ot ~1roducc, but 't".:hic:1 i:; ?~ocluccd

in enoti1-3r couatry of the suun::gion, the J iLeraliz,,t:i.cn of rcp:i.on.:-.1'

trade

fror, tourisn to shippinG and air freight,
P,y 19£0, tl:en, tl:c share of fr:ports

1

~··0,1

non-1:nr1ceri soutccs i.1 total

1
supplies of "light : 1:1anufactu1:in~ products is unlil~cJ.y to l,e lm:er th.:.~

:i.t is .1·,ot (excepting for Bolivia), but the sho.rc of ir;:1orts fro~': ,\i:,.dea.i

tinlly hir;her.

This, of course, ,.ill le a clear inaicntiun tiwt tr:!dC

ll
·
'
· tnese
l1as truk en p.1 ace in
.
cor.1mo d'J. ties.
creat10:1

This aspect of the

Andean custons union may be vicued as consolidatin~ nnd rationalizing
the industrializati on accomplished durin~ the last thirty years, es:pec·' ,.;lly

in "lir,ht" industries.

It cot!ld siRnal that these activities and their

entreprcneu:-s are no longer infants~ and that they are ready to face Latin
AnericE,n cor:.peti tion and are

lines the lareer Andean

2.l □ ost

ready to face world r.iarkets.

In some

base riay induce larger exports to the rest of

the world.
It would Le a rnistakc to re~ard the present lo,, fir,ures of in trn
Ande;:,.n tradc

12

as evidence of the low potential trade creatin~ effects

of the cor:'!'.lOn Marl~ct.

That tltey reflect to a lan~e extent p::ist national

policic:, of import-:.:;ul.Js ti tut ion, which !wve artifj ci.:1J.ly <lcnrcsscd intraAu<lc.:ir: Lr;:de by i1w1fieicnt duplicat.Lon of pro<luctio;1 focilitics, ir;

-17-

such as t!iose bet\ieeen Colo-cibia and Venezuela, Color.ld a anc.l Ecuador, Colo;nbia

and Peru, and Pertf' ;;nd Bolivin.
/,ndea.n ~oods, but

consu2er f,oods.

?.

Part of that snu~r,linr; dc.'."lls \vit:h non

substnntinl part h;:mcllcs /\ndcnn textiles and other

In~:e:eJ, market pressures ;-.,JG:ig t:.hcse borders liave notivated

old and r,ct.ty stispicions and f8ar-s.

If th:, tr.:-:de l:'..:bcrc-.liza tion pr.or,rar

fmreseen in th2 T~eaty of Cart~3~na co2cs it£ an~ihcrc n~ar schedule,

officially recorded i:.1t1_·,:-A!1dc.::.n tr3dc is ,ery lil~ely to 1.-itn2::1s phc.no,·!rrlcll

Traclc liberaliznU .on is also 1:i.kely to hv.vc other positive effects

on \1elfi1rc, some, but not all, re.lntcd to the static tr.=.:dc-crea tion gair_s.
Greater conpetition anong established

11

light" activities, most of l~hich

produce ~oocls weigh:i.n?, heavily on ,;.,orking class bud~cts, should re.due~

their relative prices, contributin g toward a better income distributio n.

14

In more ti1~n one An<lean country, import.:i.~1t H.ngc-?,oods are often produced
ur1der near-monop olistic conditions.

The new competitive climate should

also induce entrepreneu rs in these activities 5 who often have been lulled
into a fRt ol:l8opolis tic tranquility by excessive protectj_on, to become
truly modern oana[jcn:: on the ilookout for cost rE::clucin.§ innovations , and

w110 will he able to operate successfull y not only in lar~e Latin A1:1crican
m3rkets: ~mt also in n2u export rr..'.lr!~ets in the rest of the world.

The time

technique s, if necessary be: creathl~~ ne:H pan-,',;,dca n r.iultin.:-.t i0nal f irr:;s.
It may turn out that greute:r compet~ti ve pressures nay keep previousl y
overprut~ cted entrepren eurs and tr:;cic unions frm:1 capturing , ~s in the

eco:10;:iy, tlius J.e.adin1s to a wider di.:,Lri.bu ticn .of th8 '3Uins fT,),:: modern te:ch-

nolo~.y, ,:md t:.!.!_";her. empJc?:'".l 'nt-output growth ela::; ti cities,

mvJ resistc::n, •:os,

!1any pcrfer to lir:::i.t the activitie s of the coE.non r,rn;:ket

to a<~reer:1 ent.:, rcgurdinr, the establis1i: nent of ncu regional import-su bstituting

It is fe-1.rcd tI1at freeinr; trade in gootb

disorderl y co::i:)e,;·.it ion and unenployr2 ent an<l excess capacity :i.n many branch0s
of productio n.

This :i.s the sane type of fenr i-:hich existed in France and

Italy when th:; Eurcpea...'1 Corn1::on llarket Has proposed,

15

Often these fears

are inconsisU mt, as when all .Andean producers of a given good claim to
be less coi::petiti ve thoc1n other producers in the
g{rnssly eY.i.,~ger~: tcd.

zone~ and they are usually

B.';:~lc1dvely capitnl-r ich countries co:1,plain about

cheap foreign labor, \~:iiJ_e labor-ric h countries con:plain about cheap forei?,n
machinery .

Pclativcl y c:,pcn economies coriplain that they are at a disad·\fan tage

becc>.u£cC they started late in their industria lization, while entrepren eurs
in rclntivcl y closed cco:10r.1ies ask _for more ti~c to i:;et used to competiti on.
No doubt the eliminati on of barriers to /m<lenn trade will. increase
cot:1pctiti vc prcsr;ures on _£111 producers , even :i.f it also e~:pands their n~rl~cts.
But the trnnidtic n tow:n:t! n. neu sltu.'.llion u:i.lJ not be as vJolent and

-1,··
I'"t .. -··nn
i.)
J.. .,_ of cJ.
l
for t '1e
.;..c..

\.,._

t:-nt

II.;..,
-':1.1..1.v

11 1stries"
i',v
i. .. ~H...

rc~•i'in
-- ..,,.,.,
,.-!,;
• t~ .- ..
, .. c.,..;
•·•'~- c'I:1

)

c~·pnc1· c...,1]).. 7 in
.-,

~

Secondly, neither c,:1tr2~rcnc·J r:, r.or ccnse:::crs

Peru, EcuaC:o-r c'.lnd Bolivia.

ch~nce thE'ir. rli:!ns quJc]:l:,, either bcc.:1usc of c:-:r,2city lfr"d.ts 2nd r:i~rkctin~

with out tr.c trireat of nn ir-:::ncdi2te catastror,~-:.e .

11::.nally,

2s

bs.s beer, noted,

adjustment is easier th2n in a context of s!:2zn2.tiG... ; Br.ny rc"lc:.tiveJ.y

inef ficicnt: firms may si..,"lp1y hav~ to reduce t't,~ir e:-:pc.nsion and ch,:me;e ~~•eir

output will thus be produced by the more efficient pl£.nts, ui thout neccss,qrily
The threa!:. of coopctition ra2.y otten lead to g~ins

creatine excess capacity,

in efficiency without being accor.1po.nicd by a~tu;::l inc:r.c..,ci.lts in tr2.de L'.l•:-;s.
In spite of these arr,um.:mts, £ears about trade liberalizat ion will

persist.

Indeed, in soi!le cases, and in spite of fast growth, economic efficiency

may indicate the advisabil:i.t y of clos:l.ng dmm pl.:mts ar.::1 rcalJ.oc~tin g their

labor force.

,'\s the Andem1 authorities se1:::i to be c:.w2.re, it will be useful

to have genet'ous progrn.11s set up by the ADC to g~2.:1t credits and r~~.::c'.:·-::.:::.3 _

facilities to entrepreneu rs and workers sevc-r~ly ht::rt by intr.::-Ar.dea n cc:npetii:±on ,

w,d willing to shift to other activlti~s.
This insurance against exce~sivc adjustment costs to tredc liberalizat ion
and against an uncqui thblc distr:~butio n of t!1,-::: burden, cce-;!1S perferablc

to the plc.Eu; for cletuilul

11

plannin'.~" oit:en hccird frc:n critics of the trade

a dececk~ cnaracted.7-cd by the accentance of plnrmin(• in Latin AnericaJ

subrer;io,,2.l tr2de in :2~:,1y products,

It is f>rcciscly ucci1t1o;c in n:b:cd econo!:1ics

planning~ ,;i1ether n2Lio:12l or rc~icmal, should concn1t:Y.a.te on pr::o,:it.y

central 2uthority ce;:-i L,ke a 2ecis:i.on on th~ bssis of ,:uc:, stu:::!ic:;.

completed.)

(D.:i':[~

Given the difficulties Latin /1::1erica.n countries have h2d

buildinr, up planning at the nationel level, the proj,:ct of ~uidin,; each

atep of intcgrntion· from a rnnstcr plan covering five countries is fo~:~h,;,ly 0

It shou.ld nJ.so be borne in mind that in_ ruost cases it is difficult to pccdict
Economic history

ex-antc"'°which country should specialize in Nhich activity.

teaches us that often socially profitable specialization cones frci1 bold
initiatives of (private and public) entrepreneurs, which nay not lrnve met

with the approvai of central authorities.

Tl1e executive rc~ional authority

directing the steps of t.:hc AndeD.n :;roup would, therefore,

co

well to

limit its regional plcnnin~ to a few critical sectors and policies,
esta b 1 ishing for t l1e rest general
agenda will keep

ci10 □

quite busy.

11

rules of the p,ame. "J.6

This _"mocr:.st''
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inc;J.vicluall;,, ::X,port su0stituticn in th.::se inul'.strics h2s bc-::,1 or could l:,e
-The effort t!ill be less costly

very expensiw'., due to s:•alJ.ness of r:-2rket.

.

goo~s even ~ithout protcc tJ.0n.

17

tariff, and tkit the regional output of pape·r, pulp, petyoch2r.1ic2.ls , r·.:~::.~ls,
machi:iery, eq1-1ipn2nt, etc., uill expand at

,1

L'."<ster. rate than their. ir;p"::·to

frc;rn non-Anci,.-:Di.F:so urces.

Bec2use of tl:e econo!::',e.s of scale ,-~1,ich cho1:;;:: ':e:.:ize

many of the::se activities,

2

;n:olifen1.tion of nlent:s ,,ould :-,ot be clesir,~Y:.c.

1

Jo.i.ut: rt:,p,iontd. planning plus a common e}:ternal tarif:t which rices not ,,h6:ly

elililinate fo1:e:i.r,n competitive pressures may be the best instn,-:-~snts .1vailnble
t'o avoid exc.essiv8 re8ional costs in those ncu industries.

TI1c presu~ption

in fovor of the central planning of Tuany of these "heavy" acti•1ities (c. i·,.,
steel), is strengthened by the fact that already they are handled by pu1Hic
enterprises in /;ndean countries.
Some trade diversion is bound to occur in the dynamic branches of
manufacturing.

Such trade diversion, or re~ionnl import su~)stitution

going beyond that \•:hich would occur tmder ideal neo-classicnl assumptions
(free trade, equilibriun C>:chan°,e rates, etc.), is a cost whj_ch the Andean
countries appear ,-.•illing to pay for having n □ ore diversified industri.:11
structure and for achievinr, non-econoc1ic p,onls.
.opclled out c.nrefully, but they p,o beyond a noive:

TI1ese tar~ets are seldom
1

'tlcsirc for :Industry",

They
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worl<l ec.c:1cnic C<'!1tcrs, nartly by a desire to avoid the unccrt::m:iti es of
internatic•n al trDc!e, end ,'1lso b:;1 rm intuit-j_vc Drcferc:1c8 for "!Hl.::vy" interrnedic'.lt2 .:1;1d cnpi tr,l socds indu:::-trics, \,;hid: ~re su~p0scd to nce:cle:rate
capit2l totT.12tion, te:chnolo:;ic nl chan~e E,nd

11

oacb1ani linka0,es".

A i'unda-

autonony, the cos ls of t!iat Li~adc divcr,.,io::, by car.::!ful selection of
industries to be ~ivcn si~eci2l protect:i.on.

This ne~! sta1c of. innort su'!:-

This is of n,,rticul,,,.

star;e of h1port S\.1l 1 :,titution ;::t a nation2J. level.

inport.~nce due to tbe nature of. tile !'>ends subject tc t'hc

As pointed out, thQy are intcrnediat e and Ccl!}ital

0

oods.

D"'':J'

:ir'.'c'ort substit:ut:i.o n

Inefficienci eE'

in those activities ,dll nlso affect all other A..11clean industries relyin;;
on then for inpu 1:s, incluc!inr, exporters.
!r.:i.port substitutio n at the regional level uill be guided nainly by
cornpJ.e1-:1en tation agreeP.ents in key industrial areas, such as petrocheini cals,

basic nctals, auto:::otive industry, etc.

: :ost pro~ress up until nmr has

been rer,istered in petroche:-:1i cals, electronics , and r,,etals in <1encral.

The anreeuent on pctrochenic als, already si~ned by ~olivia, Color!bia, Chile
and Pcrd, covers 23 inportant products, whose production is allocated anonP,
•

the participati n? countries.

1G

Petrochemic als offcrec a pronisin~ area

for this type of arran<>,cnen t, as Andcilr. countries hnd not yet invested heavy
sums 1n their ::reduction, althnu";l sevcrul ~icre at the vcr~c of <loinr>. so.
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ar8 n s!:lall ~rice
subst itutic a, clause s of the ar4rce nent liniti1 p entry
;}il T1lnnt s, so lon~
to pay to avoid prolif eratio n of very unccono'.--:1.cal S □

•-•!1ici1 nainta in some
as the co:,-.nu nity autho rities keep co-:c.non tariff leveh;

t :i.n t!,e lon:; run
that the stc?rti n~ 1:Tst~: !-cticn s m1 fir., entry ,_,ill re,;uJ.

:'::ovid e a :~c.:::d r:io-.:!el
count ries in i-he autu,o t:i.ve inclu:=:;try cert'-lJ .nly docs :-.cl:

to follm1 ,

'.'1C

~et riciou s slogan ee1·i:1 3 aLou t "=rec coc.1pc ti Li.on

II

not1.1 i t'.1s tar.diw ~.

only for nev
An /',1,dr-:tn q;rol1}) lir:cite d to pro,iot inrr subrcc •ional trade

st.:1.11 cxu:t co~par cu

0

:i th a situ2t ion in ,.;:dch each countx -y carr:i.,:,<.1 c,_i..

that inport s-.ibst itutio! 1 In isolat ion.

But tlw ~rmvt':1 of intra-t ,ndean trn<la

relati vely !'linor ;
and its i1TJpal'.'t on A!iuecn overa ll expan sion ,,oul_d rer1ain
are alread y only
note that fc,..,. the Andean Ii'ive ~akcn as a ,-,hole in!)or ts

only part of those
about 11 p~r cent of G:)I', accor<l i.n<; to T,fole 1, and that
t durin~ the next
inport s can "reaso nably" be substi tuted for local outpu
ten years.

Andear l
Brazi l m1t1 : :exico , ,~ith GDP' s lnr·,,._er than that for the

S'JP (also accor< lin~
Five, have in-port co;::ff icients o.f obout 5 per cent of

sul)st itutio n hns not
to Tabl13 1), .snd even with tl1eir larr>e narLe ts inpor t
19
In short, it is <liffic ult to visual i:~c
al~Jayn yielde d saUsf actory result s.
lil>cr alizat ion across
signif icant Andean cconon ic :i.nte'' .ration ui tiwut trade
on of an econom ic
the bbnrd; ,-iit11o ut it the uholc inpetu s toH2rcl the creati
nnd rioliti c~l co~~mn :i.ty •:ill ~d.t:10 r.

f-:ct·c.,r- ....~\\:-_:~--_-:-::"'!t~,.
_.. s tc.'::-:.rr~ ~r-.tr::.-.··-~1,!~ .-:1: -----Ou~-1,...:·.:-·~ fr·,r .!-:"ie~:..:.,,:1 •"'l~,lici
----~ ----·------ --·---- ------··
1

--------•----

labor and c.'.'.rit al.

In

c1

custon s union includi n<>. only tr2d2 in pocc:" .r.nd

sion, c1ncl·i,::.cre
serv:i. ces, nird.fu l of the dan~c rs of c~:ces;:-:i.ve traclc- dj_ver
y en..., :i:;'.·:oi~ t
the balanc e of pay;"!'ents constr o.int J.i!'.!its hoF ;·,uc:1 a cc-;.n1t1~

neglip ;ibJ.e.

A flcrnib 1c exclrnn ~e rate can nluays insure bc:;,lance in the

dc:n,,-er of unfavo raLJ.e
intern ationa l accou nts, and expor t taxes c·,'1 handle t:1e

terms of trade ef fee ts.

But ,Jith conple· ._r ly free flo~rn of labor c1nd

capita l, no such rapid adjust ment i'lCcha nisns exist.

This is why,

0

iven

solida rity is
presen t nation alisr.1 s and ,1hile !)Olit ical and socia l An<leD..n

ers should be limitcc .1
still in its infanc y, the flow of £actor s across fronti
(and contro lled).

bian.
iJnr.c the frictio ns vhich lea;al and illeP,a l Colot1

mi~rat- 1 · .,.•· into Venez uela have create d.

Other exanp lcs includ e Chilea n,

a..,d i3olivi an nir;ra tion
BcJ.:i.vian and Paragu ayan~ :ni~ra tions into Arrcn tina,

into northe rn Chile.

Even under those contro ls fearfl of "clisne :-1bcrn cnt"

countr ~1
(in the sense that ~-1ith intc~r ation s01'le re~ion s of tile

!'1i."'.y

becom e

cou,1tr. icc~ t::.::n uith
c.~concmic.'.llly lihl:ed rn.lre clor;el y oith rcr:icn s of oth8r

-25-

And indeed new econOT'.lic patterns arc likely to cr:,cr"'.e,

labor may persist.

say al.on?, li1e Chile-Peru P.nd Colo1:•\Jiic.-Ecuador fro.1ticrs as a result of

trade liberalization.

Co~~~1:::. t:,' ai..; bori. ti.::.:; could never the less {in., [i tab ly enc.ourc1~e cur L&in

suffers frcn shorta~es of t:nskillc!d lnbor, spC:cific bottJ.c:10.d:s in s/:1.llcd

of such skills :l.nto

Oi,C

co::-.mon T.la:r.1:ct.

r.rcsh ir.vestr.:cnts into .1:hu,:1;,n cap~.r.al"

cocld be jointly plannc.d) especially in the fields of ~1i~lier cducatic,n
end scientific and techr.oloc;ical :•:esearch, m d th:Is 1~ill co::ill for sor·.2
labor nobility ui thin th2 zone.

;,,c,~ional

11

ce:1tcrs of excellc:1C:e" for

tin technolo/jy, etc., could be established with the help of the ADC, and

by pooling Andean talents.
The Treaty of Carta~ena refers to the inportance of crcatino, Anck:!u.n

owncd nultinat:lonal corporations, able to opero.te ~rith sinilar case in

the five countries.

These are likely to include nublic, 11rivate and nixed

enterprises, and \lill of course require, as in the case of the ADC, some
intra-/1-.ndcan capital rnovc.ncnts.

In so!'le cases, joint ventures could be

2
undertaken ,;ith non-Andean Latin ·A~8rican conpanics, '.) or ~.rith those of
industrialized countries (:'.:ore on this bclc,v).

Andean r,lanncrs are conscious

of the failure of the European cor.:::on r:iarket nuthorities to provide leadership
in the creation of all-European fiIT!ls; they do not •.•l,:mt to r2peat their

'weak rierfornnnc:e.

I.le fore Deccinber 1971 tlie Cc1,T'lissio~, foll0uin~ th2 nrlvicc

-2.Sa-

Ecl!:idor

Peru
19~,-~1

Doli·1i.:-i
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65
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19

79

46

51

95

70

65

10

26

51
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1

Chile

L l?ocdstt1~f.s, bcver;:,_~-?.s
tch2cco, t:.::-:t:f.l~-S,
clothin~;~ ~:·ucd and
lcathc:r. f- . . :~_:Jt;ct.s.

n..

Paper iinJ. reb )C.r c~~1d
their p;:cJuct.:;, chei:::;..cals,
non··rr.2 ta 11 ic :t1.~nernls,
ba;3ic i;1c;t,~;l~:

$

III.

Petro.:- 1,,,eic- c:ls

......

!-!~chi.1 c,ry s."!.d
equiµ:,':en t:, m,..: tal.-

-.;7

working.

v.

Printing und r- ublishing,
other manuf.:-icturing.

.

Source:

..

"

11
Adnpt2d froo Edmar L. Bacha, Venezue1a y El Cr.npo Andino. El rxcb"'lema y
las AJ.lernativas", El Trir.:estre Eccmc:nico, Vol. XX.'-:VII (1), lfo. 145,
Janm:r.y-Iktrch 19 70, P. 160, Table UI. "Total Supplies" refer to
imports plus ciomestic output.

-26a u:.i: orn rc<"'.i-~, [or the cYc.: 1tion of
of the J ..:ata , is ~;c;u ,<lulc d to ;:-,d,,nt

affo rd,
meas ure of ucal th is the u.:is tc one can

rich as Euro pe,

Lat:i .n Anc ricn is not as

s it can .:?nd
In t11c ficlc , of r:iul tina ticn al cor: )or~ tion

it shou ld do bett er,

1121

., econ ~··,i -..
,..,,..,
_;,.,_~'"'
•. ,
" clo"
. u er oo''t-1
t 1,1c 197f"\•. 1 c-,....,, for ,4.
o~.,,.
',
•i..,;..._.-..;n"
.... ,
. 't~"
,:.,._ "a''
rin,.,
.• ,,
-ren"
,.c.J.
tJ
-_..:..1"'L.
to S ,.,,.,,.,.
~-;,-i.... .

:iariJ ; to i',nd<::a,1 publ ic .::id priv ate
free An<lc.'!,m c.'!.: Jital mar ket, one.n pr.:tr
e '.:o crea te A:--.dcan finrm cii=J l asse ts
ente rpri ses, It Hi 11 also be desi rabl
fro:--i -;,-,:diU::1-nnd r~r,2 11-si zccl sewe rs,
whic h uill b(S c.ble to attr. ?.ct fu:-.cls
··s, such 2s ~utu al fund s, whic i1
thus offe ring alte rnat ives to fore i~n essa

of And.can ir.v~ s ':,::b1 c ft!'1d s.
thre aten to bcco! .le nn irir,o rtE,l ,t d:::-ain

Grad t,.&l

soc:' .al secu rity poli cies , as wel l
harn oniz atio n of fir:c al, mon etary , and
ged :i.n t:1e Trea ty of Cart aq,e na,
as ad hoc nech anis ns, also va~u ely pled

will enco urag e such a tren d,
not rece ive the top prio rity
But ham oniz atio n of such poli cies need
tinr,
an r.ml tina tion al fim s and to coor dina
wllic h shou ld be give n to crea tin~ Ande

ancl inve stor s.
Ande an poli cies toun rd forc i~n trad ers

it wou ld

ue

In othe r uord s,

atte opt duri ng the 1970 's
prer :atu re, and ~ote ntia lly harr: 1ful, to

a sin~ le curr ency area , uith free
to tran sfor n the tiude an subr er~io n into
fisc al poli cies , In part icul ar,
fact or mov enen ts and conn on Mon etary and
.ngc rate s, even if all coun tr:i.c ,:;
it Houl d be a t'list alw to try to free ze exc]w
si:1i l2-c to eac~1 ot}ie r c1nd to t~os e
in the rc~i on h~d r.ntc s of infl atio n
clcn r t 11at, give n une1 ual infl ntio naty
of '~!ic rest of the yor ld". It is
n~
it \·7ould Le fooll lnrd: , to nttc r:pt naki
cond ition s in diff eren t coun td.c s,

cnc.l of inflc!ti cn~
the rei;ic.:~ into a 1.::1ific J currc-n-:::y :n-ea, ,,,hilc ,.,aitL~· : for the
the
say in Cr·d le, is 1i1:cly to nostr1m 1c indefin itely and u:mece ssarily
1
:Jut evc:n ,i::thou t infl::;.t ion, trac o libc.ral iz:? den

intecra tion efforts .

structu ral
and the ccnvcrr ence ta,ard a con~on extern al tariff ncy indcce

2.t l-2c1st
balnuce of payr:cn ts acljustr ::ents, tlwre uill l-,8 a ~r2.::t-2 r r18cd,

durin~

c1.

tr,,nsi tion period , for e. nore fle:Yib lc excha,-,r ~e rate policy

in each country .

It should be borne in r::ir d that the An<lean inte,'.l" ation

such as
process ,1ill hopefu lly be accc:::p anied, at .. cast in co;mtr ies

vi£ -a-vL;
Chile a,1d Colo,:ib ia, by a ration; ilizatio n 21·d lrnmrin "', of !,rotect ic,:1
lhf.:! rest of the Horld.

The Junta, of rotffSl! , shoulc ~!~":'!° <;Pner,u . '\L!:.i.ctc-

ity nee::ls.
1:J.nes to reconc ile nation al exchan~ e rate flexib ility w:i.th comnun
rs.
Outlook for f,ndean Dolicie s tm-wrcl non-And eari traders ,md investo

subrc,...._ion
One of the e:,:,~ct ed benefi ts fror1 the creatio n of t~,c. Andean
in~ power" .
is typi.ca lly suDnar {zed by the expres sion "increa se in bar~ain
Andean
For exar::pl e • in the con~er cinl field it is to be expecte d that the
:, -s·ay
Five acting in unison uill be in a s tron~cr positio n w:1en dealino

on.
with Europe an Comnon Harket , than if each coui1try ne~ot:i .ated in isolati
ning
A very inporta n t ap;)lic ation of the princip le of n;reate r bar~ni
direct
poi1er by joint action is exr,ec.te d to take place in dealin~ with

foreir,n investo rs.

Here the object ives arc not only cconon ic ancl

l
in the nnrrm, sense, but also include obtaini lw, ~reate r Andean contro
over its econo::i y.

22
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that the er.cation of a conl"lon tilarket will lceu to a massive inflo~-1 of foreirn

oultinatlonnl corpor.·.:.ticr.s, t,hid1 are bcttC:!r er1uippcd thr..n nationnl f:!.1T.1s
and even A~1c!can oulU.n::tional f:r.:.-.-1s, to tnl~o 8.dvantc1se of the brozci2r cconcnic

for~ign inv'.~S tment, as uell as to;,1c1rd for.::1.su 1-'c:,tcnts, li.c.:-r-,ses nn<l rc:y :dty

Comprabcn91ve data on actual direct fozeisn invcstoent in the lnd25~

arid smelZ'.i.:,J,~ continuing a tradition. ~oin~ back to the c.:)r.ly days o1 th~
Spanish cor.qi..ast of the Andean hic;hli.ncls.

0£ the total 1968 book

value of U~S.- direct forei.~n invcstnent in the three lar.-r;est Andean

cou.,trics (Chile, Colo:::b:i.a and Peru)• at least 60 per cent uas in those
11.ctivities.

24 Japenese investors hnve recently also shown keen inter.est

in the n:l.nc~:.::il .:esourccs of thc~e countries• ,-:hich could be lhllellcd Pccffic
El.fl

well aa Andean.

U.S. Departr,ient of Cotn!'!er.·cc ciata, ho~wvar, indicv.te

that U.S. cii1:ect inve~"!:r:mnt in T'lDn\.lfacturing has Brown foster than other

itens; while. such invcstr.::.~nts anount:ed to only 8 per cent of total
book value of U.S. direct investm~nts in Chil.c, Colonbia v.nd I'er~ in 1950,

thd.r share lwd reached 16 per cent by 1968.

It is notcuorthy that in

spite of the m1allcr naU.onnl r.i.::irb:ts in thosr; ccuntrics compared to
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. ) 25
" . ·1 an d ..
;exico.
Ar~ent i na, urazi

/

i:1 Pc:r:us

Company ah. 0 fodit:ates that :i.n snite of the public diffidence: shO';Tfl l>y
0

foreir~~n inve:;torn and thci r dc,·rn.nds for

11

favora~,lc cli::1:1te' 1 )

co1.mtries art' rc~8.n!ed as ntt·cactive nlnccs ,.,here to invest,

t.:1c Andcc:n
'i;,c bar'.'a:Ld.nC;

than uhat one, Houlcl thin!~ by rendin" business nrid po1)ular jOl.\";_":12.ls.
Th~t bat~aining po<Jer is pr.cbr.bly stron~es·t in the field of

nat1.1r:1l res J· recs.

It could

be

further strcn~then::.-d by a closer coordinat:1.on

and eventual ncrp:er of the national public enterprises uhic:1 no,l act in

minerals, oil, transrort, cor.1mmications and cl~ctt:i:d.ty.
as

1

'C~i:!.lcanzation 11 and ''reruo;}nization

11

l'ro~;rans such

of copner coul<l pro~)c'.Jl} r:nin :in

bargainin8 str.engt'.1, as ,;ell as efficiency, l.>y t 11eir joint r:,lnnninr,;.

The fact that several industrialized rc<;ions, suc:1 or; Jannn, the U,S.,

and Uestern and 2.'lstern Europe are eac:1 interested in obtainir," access to

rau nntcr-ials naturnlly :,trcngthened the 1\ndcan !1and.

These ,")r.e likely to be clo3er to those of, say, 1-fexico than the r.iorc

accct:ni:in<~

intere;;:t :i.n /mdecu, circles.

cc;-, s:lcleraL,l c

1:·1e foreign ui:i.ist2rs .of the Anc8an Five,

r.ic·etin'."' in LiTn on J0vc,1.1'ber 1969, reaffin. "J that it uill lJe 1\ndcan uolicy
to enco~ir::t(;e pre£c:-en tially Ar1dean entrc 1ni:7curs, an::1 to control foreif'.n

investn2n t.

It is lil~ely that certE.~•• .:L-.l<ls, such as nest ",,cr~etati ve•:

as uell a::; banl:in<";, cor·,nunic atior:s 1
and key "clynm:1:.c" brnnciics of nanufactu rinr-,
. •

etc., \;rill ~Je increEisini">;J.y reserved for riu1iic and urivatc Andean entrepreneurs.

This trend is already r:mrked in !'eru, 3olivia, C}1ilc and Colonbia.

As noted earlier, the trade field.als o offers ~otential regards

to joint Andean :,olicics, not only when-dea lin~ uith trade blocs such as
those of Hestern and Eastern Europe, but also in dealin<; uith tl!e larl"\er
LAFTA countries , and uith the rapidly expandin_~ Japanese and Au.stralia n
ma~ k ets,
J!IDY

' ' h
u111c

·
,iJasin.
• f ·
n.!.·ac:i._1c
'
·
tne
. ' t h e ,\ n d ean countries
s.h are ~n.ta

26

One

asl~ \1hether Andean (and Latin Aeerican) l>ar'!ainin ~ 'f>OT7er should Le

used to obtain re~ion;il trade preferc:1c cs fron tl1e United States.

On

this point Colonbia and her partners alJpear to have different viet-1s.

It. should be note<l that durino- t!;e 19G0's ,\ndcan intcrnnti onal trnde has

becor.1ci ''.Co<r,ra!)! iicnlly r10rc diversifi ed; sch'.:!nes for U.S. regional pn,fcrcnc cs

-.:H-

It is difficult to visu3li2c, for exa~~l~,

that LL\'r-TA ,;:'.J.J. cc:-lt:in'..!e dcvelopi1w :::t a v1:.ry slo1·1 pace.

°'1 the other

Uhilc it is \,nlil~ely that the Ande.:n ~roup ~,iJ.l ~e joined in the
ic::cdi.:.tc f1:tu;:c by other countries (exccptin1 \Jcnezuela), it is possible

that :i.t uilJ. c.'.::·:clo? s;::-cc:L:.l links uit:h Central i,r•;crica and t!1e Caribbecln

s110rc:; bo!·h c,\ tl,~ P.1cific o.nd the C2.i:ibbcan.

27

of tHo !'.'ajar tyne:s.

c:.:c.::tiu:1 of tl1e
crc.1p c" l, r_ ·.-. ,fi'.·~ •..'i.11 ari.s~~ froq the'.

cr~?.ti.cl'!:

~ 1· ,-: ~

One

;1vor;i~ile J.c.,r:" run effects of tr .aic

~-c:: 1 C..-~•"l ~inin~, DOl.·Jt?r vis-a-vis

tltC!

re,:; c of the ,.1-.,rld, J)o:;sible

,,
-·.)

scurq;icn.

'l'h2. othc:r ty,ic of

I

.. "

benefit~ \!ill, for

.:1

suust.::nti.:11 period

of tiu', Le otiu.:i.ncd at tk; expense of subre'.;ional partners.

p;.n:tn,'.J:s.

TJhen an

T.be benefit to that couatry, Dl,~Jectin~ for a r.icir::,-nt quid pn>

matc:hccl uy a ,,,·.rsenins of pnrtners' terr:1s o: tr2.de._

Unless such "infant

in<lustr:Les" r-1at:•.:re so as to r:,~k0 its rc~i.011,,l protection supL1;-:fluous,
th~ si tuat:i.on •, ·i.J.l per.sis t in(lefini tcly.

Natur~lly, eacl1 councry will be expected to return the favor re~ar<lin~
the second type of benefit, and thus incur in cor~espondin~ costs to sub
sidize the protected regional industries located in partner countries.

nut

there are likc~.y to be otiwi: costs, nainly ,if a short- or r,:icdium-run nature.
11
These can be sur::uarized under the label of "burden of adjustr.1cnt , and

are usunlly ne~lectcd in textbook discussions of lons run econooic
mechr.n:i.si;JS.

They include possil>.le cos ts of resource reallocation arisine

fron trade cre.:tion and balance of payments adjustments, as well as induced
changes in natir::,nl tax and policy-naking systeT'.ls.

TI1roughout history,

the politicr:lly powerful have tended to thrust the burden of ndjustinr,
to cl1.::·.1cing world econor.:ic conditions onto the politically we:1k; when
s•.1pply and deonnd conditions fnvor tbe ntron13, the adjustocnt burden is

proclaimed to be tbe inevitable price of pr~crcos exacted l>y a blind market,

of C\lstom un:i.cns, esp•3ciall y

ctI!lOUG

develop:.n s countrile! s.

St:ron~; poliU.c.::. l

leadershi p and solidarit y is n2ed6d if the project is to advance signif~ca ntly;
it is not yet obv:i.ous tl1c!t such lecclc:rshi p end !.>olic!ari ty •.1ilJ. be stead., Jy

leadershi p of parti.cipa ting countries hc::s not yet fully rc.alizcd the full

iraplicati ons of the Treaty of CartageQa , and they nay back dmm \,'hen th<ct:u:1e corJes for concrete actions, sucll as the lo\lcrins of inportant
protectiv e tariffs.

Colombia and Chile will have different Presidenl s

after.197 0, and the future Andean political picture and enthusias n for
integrati on nay look quite different from that at the time of the Declarati on

of Bogota.

:aotn LAfTA aild the_ Central American Cor:inon llarket have shown,

unfortuna tely, the relative political ,,,cakness of si~ned and scaled
econooic pacts, ,,hich are no l!latch for the furies of petty and archaic
chauvinis m.

Unfortun ately, there are plenty of old quarrels and ani.:1osit ies

among Andean n.::1tions (to nor.:e 1u·t a fe,.1 , the borders bet,,iecn Chile and
Bolivia and Per~: and bcLl:ccn PerJ an<l Ecuador, can still arouse strong

-34-

tnke
it :!.s po:..sil-J .e thc1t ~"·:0 of t1H~ ('n•.mtr ics uft.hin the s1:Lre<! ion ,rill
in'.3
a sharply :::ol·c left·.:,:,: c; course th,1:1 their ni:d.r:liu crs, especi dlly ree.-:>.:rd

centra l plannin ~ of econon ic activit :,',

In ti1at case, the :.1e:.shinr, tor:eth er

,.•it!l
of cconor.1:!.r>s \lith very differe nt c1 ::,~r.ees of prt,,nt. e r.wrl:et c1.ct:i.vi ty

'l'he pute:ntL :,l c:ifLLc ultics c·f the An~'.;.:;:n r:c.!;2.:1e :1.:Jve bec.n fc,re-·

to s:i.: 5n
shadm1 ed by tile unsucc essful ne::~oti 2.tions to co:,vin cc Vc,nczu e}a

the Trenty of
fear of

~

Cart8~<':-i.·➔•

Vene?-1. 1c:n objccti . . , ns to that Treaty• involve
1,0

trncie er.catio n ancl diversi ont criupled with prcocc upntion

v:i.s-c:- vis
with the po~:siu ility 0£ Hn:i;e ard chronic d~i'::ic:i. tG of Venezu ela
the Antle,u1 Five.

This pt:eoccu p.c:tinn is rooL !d in the peculia r price\

letions
cost structm :e of the oil-ric h Venezu el.10 cc.:mon y; inu.:::ed , cali..:u
con.pe titi·re
using recent exchanr ,e rates confin; i across- the-bo ard Venezu elan
29
·
:Jut even assumin B that
disadva ntap,es with respec t to at least Cliile.
), the
sonehou (perhap s usin3 <lu.:il exchnnr ,e rates, or sinila r sche□es

. Venezu elan-An dean Five trade could be equilib r 1.ated,i t is likely
that V:enezu elan l!lisgiv ings uould persis t.

Vis-a- vis the Andean Five,

ntensiv e
Venezu ela is likely to hnve compar ative disadv antage in labor-i
contro ls
activi ties, such as tej;tilc s, ,~l1ich have expand ed behind inport
only relativ ely recei1t ly.

Firt.'1~ in such indust ries, -nearly all privat e,

tition.
take a din view of the threat of Colomb inn and Chilc,:m compe

But

ically
many Venezu elan fin~s, public and privat e, also have a nore econon
legitim ate case agnins t the Cartag ena progrm: i,

Traclit ionnlly , they have

in uor.ld
importe d capita l and in tcr::1ed iatc ~oods at pric;c,s prc:vail in<r,
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ca:.:.:::on c::t .:: ..· i:::il tarif f

c?t'C · 31::.os t

certa in to raise those price s for

sc!3 toi.•ar d Ande,m
Venezuelc:1:1 i.Juyer s, to induc e diver sion of their purcha
be Venez uelan ,
produ cers of those eoods , not all of which ,:ould

Acl:.ling

urs to t:,e Treat y of
to the opp:-,;;i tion of Venez uelan priva te entrep rc~ne

o\-mcc.!, such as in
from trade . liiv-2r sicin are partly ·:or total ly pu:.,li cly

pctrocher:1:i. c2J.s and steel .

Sorae llnclea n obser vers have also re:-.1arked that

Venez uel&n econo ny rn:ese nts
t1;,2. larsc ;;;;fju cncc of foreig n inves tors in tl1e
patib ili ty, echoin r; llri tlsh
l'n additi o:1a: reason for Andea n-Ven ezuela n incon
Conti nent al ~iffi culti es in Weste rn Europ e.
The i\ncl

,,n

increa :::e
comrion exter nal tarif f is also likel y to lnply an

(or of i~por t conv· ols
tn mnny Pr:·ruv i.an. Boliv1 .cm and Ecuad orian tarif fs
t in decre ases in
C>:pre ssed as equiv alent tarif fs), even if they resul

bia.
tarif fs or tariff -equi valen cies for Chile and Colom

Indee d, for a

was in doubt , for
while Peru-.: i,-,n agree ncnt to the Treat y of Carta gena
tinr; the Treat y.
reaso ns sinil ar to those given by Venez uela for rejec
poten tial trade diver sion
The two \1cake st coun tries, Ecuad or and Boliv ia, face
not only in produ cts of

11

dyfi11mic" or new indur .tries , but also, as sugge sted

acture d produ cts.
by Table 2 espec ially for Boliv ia, in simpl er nanuf
of the Andea n Five
Dut these two coun tries, coI!lp risin?, only 19 per cent
theor etica l safeg uards
popul ation , have receiv ed a~;co nside rable numbe r of
the J\DC.
and assur ances in both the Treat y of Carta gcnn and

Indee d, there

table actio ns clscu here
is a dange r that the ,\DC :;:iay negle ct socia lly profi
~ 3oliv ia and Ecuad or.
for the s~ke of concc ntrati n~ on proje cti bcnc fittin

for contr ibutio ns
lntcc ratio n, as noted by C,P. Kincl lcber~ er, calls

~
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f.
burden ), and i~vcstn ents accordi ng to some calcul ation of pay-of

ineffic ient
Offset ting trade diversi on costly to Ecuado r and Bolivia wit!1
subrer, ion.
invcstr .,cnts in these countr, ics '1111 not encour n;c ::;roi-Jth in the
and
llhile it ~li''-:' be diffic ult to be precise ahour. all of tne costs

ro~~hl f quantf~ i~d~

The r~3l costs of rcsion al trade diversi o~, for

me::1b<.'r
cxar,1pl e, slioultl iJ::~ dj_str:i.i :,utcd. in a conscio us fncJh:i.oi1 ano:ir, the

cov.ntt ies,

f_,::,cip rocity should not 'b~ defined with respec t to an equal

y, not
expans ion of n::gion al i::ipol'.-ts and e::ports in each ne,~,l>er COi..!ntr

w:tth equnl e..{!;;:-,nsicn of tre.dc in manufa ctured ~oocls,

Ratlier) it si,oulc1

fron tra<lr;
rc~fer ·r2.rtl; Lo a fair d:i.stri bution of the real costs arisinr ;

s are
the Andean i:voup increas e by the same amount , but that its c:q,ort

some. prices
made up by r,oods wi.1ich it could sell in uorld market s at the
s are
it receive $ from i,ndean custora ~rs (e.~., cotton ), ,lhile its inport

s at
made up by goods which Peru previou sly inporte d fro::i ,.·orld n,<rket
louer prices (e,~. machin ery).

Althour ,h its re~ion al trade is balanc ed.

market
it cotiJ.d hardly he said th,'.'!.t Peru is bencfi ttinr; frc~1 the co::..10n
pro<luc tsJ
or that it is rcceivi n~ recipro city for its purci1a ses of Andean

world market s.
whose prices (at least for a dlile) are hip,her th2n those in
d
Recipr ocity could be !"ecstn blishcd , ccteris -parib1i: :;, if Peru exporte
in uorld
to the subreg ion roods \!lw::;e prices \Jere also above Uiose
ng its
r.l'arkct s, in an amount uhich cot".lpenst<!ecl the real costs of diverti

i~ports froQ world to ~ndcan c~q,ort ers.

30
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of \lhat c.::.c:li courtti:~· ohtai.ns, net, fro:1 inleztati" on.

ready, such calcuL1ti;_,:,::.,

frictions .

IZU,7

Even if rouc;h-nnd -

help to forer.ce c!ifficult:t c::. and avoid

In particuln r, by kc~pin3 tabs on the costs of trade diversion ,

under prcs:.m e fron vented intc!i:csts , it nay be turned into a nerc<':nt ili:;tic

mechanir..~ to promote e:-:cJ.usive:l~:'. i1::port substitut ion ,,t the regional

levci!:.,' pc::1,a·. :, with Ll,2 excuse of supportil! f: overvalue.- :! exchan~e rn tes

econordeG of scale uill 11elp to reduce the real costs of some nev industrie s~

it may still leave unit costs in many activitie s ~my above world market
costs.

Unch., thesC! circunsta nces rapid and efficient Andean ~routh will

re.quire an expandine volume of e:x:ports to the rest of the world, to
f:fnance growing inports of capital and internedi ate goods whose productio n
in the re~ion may still be uneconom ical.

As the e::-rpcricnc e of iraport

s~bstitut ion at tl1e national level shows, the creation of inefficie nt
intermedi ate and capital goods industrie s will have ne~ative cost-push
effects throur;hou t the economy, and especiall y on non·-trad itional exports.
Countries uith a lon~~ tradition of export pronotion , such as Peru. will
do ,,ell to tccp a sharp eye on the level and structure of the common externnl

tariff.
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~cs
the effici ency of, say, that cf Drazi l, it wlll gc~c~~ tc p==ssu

intcrc stB new
j:nport sv:J:::L :'.tutio: : at the n8.t:io- ,,2l level c;~e.:itccl vc:::te.~

in activ ities
this risl: is to pror-,o te regicn t!l :i.npor t s:.,l.i::t:~ tut.ic;: i c:,ly
oi: ef.:::i.c iency
where on.2 can be reason ably sure that acc.::p t<'ble levc-1: ,
31
uill be reache d after a few years cf "lenrn ing · by d:Ji1~~ ".

A quid. loo1~ at a nap will shou. that th 0. Ande::?:J

prima fclci<:_, the

80St

8l'.'(.::1p

i:::: not,

reason able one which -cou.l;:! h~,\'C been devise d fro:n

a vieupo in t of econo;: :iic effici ency.

For exr.i~npJ.e, · :!. :: D~kr:-s m'.:>re econom ic

ir.d:.iJ try ,dth
sense to accele rate integr atio;-i 0£ -::he Ch::.lca n nt~tom obilc

J:.a or
that of Cordob a in Argen tina, rat~er than Fith tl:csc cf Cc,lt,::'.
Venez uela.

Only one of the. Anclea'l. countr i0.~ (F2-r~) he's frc::iti c~s with

all of its four partne rs-,.

As a group, the Ar:d-2::n I-'ivc h.!!vc nc:::e trade

\iith other LAFTA count ries th.)!.1 ~~ith each o~:hc,r.
faces diffic ult
Besj_<les these long run prcocct •pr,.t i011,..., the t-.nr~·:'!2-:1 gr<::t'.j)
edjur;t Lc-nt problc r,s in the sbort nc1d w'"c!i;::11 nm.

As t:..·,:dc !'.'c~~ tiction s
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<lefi cits vis-."'-":i.•~ the rer,io n.

This (very lil~cl y) r;ossi bHi ty arousQ S

conr.:i .cler.ab le .um'.~ ety arnon3 the mern!Jer count r1.es.
bc0n fi.'Opo sed to deal ,;,.1ith it:

Sever al devi.c es have

faster· -thctn -sc!:c: d:..:lc d duty rcc~.t•-:-tions

n sys ten of d:i.ffe rent
of a p;,,yc'.;!nt:s unicill \·1ith ~2!\i:: tous. s·.:iI'!.J crcllit [.;,

by the ADC, ... t.c..

the
lic.ny o:: these devL: cs \;Jll he usefu l in clccrc os!ng

.ances in t rncle flo,rn ,
ncg.:1 tive poL tic,11 impac t of sever e reg:i.01 al ir::,!J
in the e~:p.:1nsion- of
espec ially L' they also ir.volv e; sharp c1°i.s~ 1aritic s

.....
int1:c-J..rtde;:m r.12.nu facturc C: expor ts.

But 1:1,1re funcl. ::r,snt ally, it shoul d

y invol ve balan ce,
be '.:."~cnllc~ that t:!:u~ reci.p ~0ci.t y nec~d not neces sar:i.l

~oods )J and
regio nal trade flows (nor balan ced trade in manu factur ed
cnts of a count ry is
that so long ns the overa ll y,loba l bal.sn ce of payr.i
be compe nsated by a
kept in equiii briu:. n, a defic it with a rt!i!~-on -~d'il.l
antil istic notio ns
surpl us with the rest of the uorld . Old-f ashio ned merc
s, as attcra pts to forcc e
_shoul d be disca rded when dealin g with these issue
icien cies.
stric tly balan ced regio nal flc~rn could lead to sever e ineff
,dll hnvc to rely
It t'emai ns true, hc,t,t: ver, that the Andea n count ries
globa l balan ce of
on e}~cha nge 1.·::.te. varia tions as a tool to maint ain
it was done in the
payrr-_c.H•~s equil ibrium , to a much great er exten t than
enden t contr ol
In the futur e, each Andea n count ry will lose indep

vast.

in the. post were often
over tarif fs .ind other tradz restr ictio ns, which
used

,Hi

tool~ to secur e balnn ce of payrr.c nts equil ibrium .

Lcavi n~ aside

leff to brin~ About a desired ~lobRl tarpct in the h~ln~ce ~of t~~dc.
I~ .i6·to'be .hopcd that exch2n~ c rate ~~VEG~n ts will be preferre d to a
c1
slm,:do,;: 1 in the tT.::de libcr.:;li z.:1tion 2.::-;re:..'nents, or to extrc,.:(! ,md susta::.n

effort~; to force ~~~tona l tr,sde balance ,

At any r;-.tc; intr.:-H• ztc•13l

1
'frc1de libens.l: i.zation and trw mo\1 e;_,1e.nt toward a co!!lt1on cxterna l t(ir'.·

f5;

But this develop, _,mt should not be difficu lt

of tk; Andean coi.::1t::: i2s.

to handle, a:,1d could n:oth•& te nt,ch necl~ cci. fiscal rcfu.nus .

h.

.1.,d.::-

division of funds collecte d u-;.1c:l.cr the comn:on externa l tariff, a subject

on vhich the Treaty of Cartacen e. is silent, should not be diff:!.cu lt to
devise.

The low present figures for :i.n tra-Ande en trade indicate that grf'.at
on
efforts will have to be made in estlabl:i. shing new trade and commcrc ializat5.
contacts and chmmel s.

The transpo rtation, financi al and p~ychol ogical

"ovcrhea <l 11 of trade will hnve to be built aloost from scratch , often
with the help:of the ADC.

On the other hand, intra-An dean transpo rt should

11
be facilita ted by a wide "ro<1d forn:ed between them by the Pncific , the

Panm.na Canal and the Caribbe an.

Host of the Andean populat ion centers

arc locntcd on or ncnr one of those bodies of ,rntcr.
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necause of their journalir ;tic vislLi.lit y and ,.1,,1'.'lour, thPro J.:{ .a
tendency to expect too much fro:n integrati on efforts.

the AL<lean group \-:culd only cc;:;e to about the econc.:-::tc size of: r-.·.:.'_,:o

and Braz:!.J..

11
One rmst remerr,ber that the r;reat "cc:,:::•on uar1--.ets o,: ; .. :,:7..u

prohJr::·~s of those c:o ..mtries.

I::i particulo r, the f.,::'?.,.'l. ir.tep;)::-,~ -:_

is unlil~ely to c.h2:,1ge signif:Lcc ntly the welfare of

t

\2 r,oo;:cst

> ••

c•f.

the /~nde2.n popul.::::i.o n, whether located i:·1 ':l1e big;,_er 'Jl' sr::nllc,· c.,.·.·•r,tr::

and of trying to i1!2prove them.

The less fo1portan.: target of x,:'.c;;_:{:.Lnt

the :i.ncome gaps among the Andean countr.ic~s will of course re:m,:::.. r: a
preoccupa tion of subregion ol bodies.

While not a panacea for all of the economic cc.nd social ilJ. .c; l"'•f the

subregion , a properly handled Andean custot:ls und:.on crm raise the growth
rate of each of th~ participn nt countr:i.cs signific..:n t:Ly above ,-::":.,1t those
rates uould be if each country followed in isolation .:;n import su:,stitcti o;1.
1
1
policy similar to those of the 1950 s ~,nd early 1960 s.

It could Uo this

be increasin g the efficienc y of already establish 0d iI.'idustr:!. es, by takin~

advantage of lare.2r sea.le in .selected new import substitut ing efforts.
by incrcnsin g lmdc,'.m bargrd.n:Ln ~ power in vwr1<l com:;,crce and fin.::iice, and

by creating a clirnntc conducive to faster tecl1nolo ~ical ch2nce, i~prov~d

,.
\
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It is diffic ult

ii

t this s tar,e to be precise about the adc.iitio a to

the gro\Jth rate which tlie Andean plans could bring about.

It mny be guessed

out
that it could be as h:l.~h as one pc.r.cen ta~e point, on averag e, throur.h
felt
thll next fi.[1,;cen y"".:;rs, .::li:hougl1 its benefL: .i.~.l effect s \:ill be
i::ost stron:~ ly durinz. tLc latter port of th::::.L pcriod .

l.l:.it

even if the

per ;:nnu-::i,
per capitn p:owth r_ate \. .ith intcnr- 2tion is onJ.y 7.. 7 per cent:
1

that -c.1 ::..ffere nce
compare d uith a 2.0 pi.!l" cent rat2 \d.thou t i.:.,:.,--:; re.tion, by 1935
uould me ... n a

rer

capit;J G~)l> of $550 rath.;;r i·h'-cn one of $585.

Contra ry

per cnpita
to the situat:: i on in most of Africa and Asis, the Latin t,ne.ric2 11
incooe base

J.,'.

such tl-wt appare ntly snall

c1 1 ·-::n3es

in --per ca?ita gro'l,th

y of,
rates c<1n r:iah:, the diff::,rc nce be t,.'een bre~'.::. i:-1:; into the~ incor:ie categor
du..;say~ Ital:,; within a ri:~"son.<ible tirr,~ spm•~ or remain in~ :in the semi-in

should
trializ ed stage Argent ina has bceri for the last forty years. It
ies
also be rememb ered th&t the Andean scheme f':10uld bring these countr
closer to their non-eco nor.iic goals, such

C:."'

greate r region al autoncm y

vis~a- vis the rest of the world.
s
·. So with all of its lbdtat ions and danger s, the Andean progJrai ~ appear
ally
as a worth~, ,hile and c:,citin g undert aking, which should be politic
feasib le.

One can apply to it what Paul N. Rosens tein-Iio dan has written

about Latin Americ an integra tion:
It is an idea that once launch ed.will _not and
cannot perish . It may suffer agoniz ing delays , ~reace
many diffic ulties , but it offers such obviou s ndw~nt ages
to all that we should despai r of hur.1m1 reason if narrow
nntion alistic instin cts were to stop it .32

KJ.ndlC'b erGcr, Osv~lclo Sunkel and Jlaul Saez.
urged .::P. to study the! e\•olvin~~ Andean r;r.ou,}.
presc.~.t ed in this p:::~er were . sketched in

r;iy

Paul i.~. H.osenst ein-1\oda n first

Seven1l of the ideas
"El Grupo Andino en cl

s.

Wioncze k, Ecato:c.·,

1.

rc--r

2.

See, for ex.:1:!ple , C.A. Cooper and il.F. liassell , "Tm-rnrd s a General

a discl,:,s:i .on of LbFTA h:tstory see i:i~~uel

;rheo,:-y of Custo::;s U,1ions for lJ2velop in3 ·Countr ies, 11 Th.:~ Journ,,J. nf

Develop ing Countri es", ~klm,, Vol. XXI, Fasi:. 4, 1968) pp. 713-36.

As lleacepu ts it: " .•• we would agree with the apprais al cf R.L. Allen
that customs union3 among develop ing countrie s 'are all fundame ntally
protect ionist', in the sense that they are designed to facilita te

the e}~pansio n of output in lines where money costs of product ion
are no\-1 and are likely to re:-!"lain above ,:or ld prices" .

(p. 718).

It

should be noted that l!eade writes on the basis of African exper:1.e nce.

3.

Co~npare also with the 1966 populati ons of the proposed I:iaghrel

group (32 Billion , inclutlin B llorocco , Algeria , Tunisia and Lybia),
that for East Africa (29 illllion , includin g Kenya, Uganda and T,mznni a),
'lfordck (17 Million , includin g Denmark , Iceland , Norway and Sweden) ,

and the Caribbea n Free Trade Associn tio~ (CARIFTA, includi nc'scve ral
of_ tht>. s::ialJ.cr J\ntillc s, a.bout 5 l!illio:1 ).

,.•
at:nosp hcre of p:1nan:-3ric~:1 r:20tin~ :s rG~ch:::.d a.r .:111 tin:e at tL~so sess:i.cn

had very much hr;p0d '"lofot'l ,,,oulc.l bz, chost11 ,

?,

The shares of

7 olivia

2.r:.d ~cuado r arc sn .:illf:r than tho (eqtir~l )
1

shares of r.olo,,h ia, Chile I Ieru· and 'Tenezu ela.

1\n ea.rlie r propos al

n
establi shing- s}1"'.res acco~_•dinp to cont1·i butions to the -Intcra. ru.:rica
the·
Devclop :nent B:?.nk 1 ,,1hich ,,rould hav8 !Y,eant that iTenezn cla provid2 .d
lar~es t shr->..1'('), t,·:as drop:,x, d at the rcqu.os t of ;·eru. 1 \·1hich in the
has a sr::alle r cc,ntrib ut:i.on,

:m'9 _

:arlicr propose .ls to sp-3ed up th.::J creatio n

3.ls . of thG AD'.:; 1:tl ch·cur.rv8r:t:i.n2" the noc:d to obtain Con[,:;ressior:.c~l. approv-'
were also she:lve d,

e.

co
The foll<J .-iirw arc sir;;plo n:r-ithr- :0tic means of th3 nppr0xirr.cJ.to ir,ciid(m
0

(excep t
in _:.-.d V'1loro'.'1 ".:.or.:ns of duties and ch3:r~e s appllod by !lnda.'.ln countric )~;
1
T~olivi;-i.) to ic:r,crt s clurine tho enrly 1960 s:

T-'ri•.~c1.r'f co~~.:;-.odiU.os "-nd c.-,Lr:i:'Ll,'.l.l
f~oods
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...

(.\ -: !
----

Over 8.ll AverJ.;-,C
Data obtai n-::c l .fro:-:: S.:mt iat;O . L,c, ,rio,

11

:

(:,._·.

f

.-!

·-~-- --- -·-·--·

I,"!

~•t~

%

4

(>
,)

. ) ,)

25

328

2ft 7

117

72

130%

1127,

C ,-

6Z:.:

3l♦ Z

Indu stri~ li~n tion

Prot cc.ti onit n

fr,po rt sl'.b sU.t utio n.
on qun,: L:i.t, ttiv•~ L:sL ricti or:.s to 1n-o: .,otc

thir d coun tr

ces

of. 15½, 251~ end 50% were azre cd upo,,

for

pdu-- n~::) inte r·

lucts , refp 2cti v0ly .
med iate and finn l p~tr ochc aica l ~ro<

9.

ende d u;) ,.1ith a tt,xi [[ h:ip,hz·.·
The Ccnt i:al /t:tc: rican Cm,,1~.on ilark et has

10.

1
n the A:idean.. r,rou p nc".y be
Some exam ples of pric e disp Grit ies \. :tthi

give n.

diff eren t good s in
The follo wing indi ces refe r to pric es ·for

pric e is set cqu2.~. to 100 for
the Am1can .: oun tries wher e the Chil ean
each })ro duct .

es, obta ined by
The indi ces are base d on doll ar pric

ange rate to the pric es c:-:p resse d
appl ying a purc hasi ng powe r pari ty exch

in loca l curr enci es.

Boli via

Colo r-1bi n

Ecua dor

Peru

102

64

111

98

Foot Hcnr

05

77

88

134

Cott on Clot h

55

48

53

88

\Joo len Clot h

195

100

114

Soap

151♦

49

175
127

Beer

I

The pric es refe r to 1962 .

76

...., ·:..~) :i ,~

Co]·:
·-------·

I.:oE vL:
-------

Ligh l bulb s
Un shin e cach:i!l.:.<;
Radi o

Aspi rin

rcru

Lcu~-..1\.r!.~
--·----

123

D.9

70

107

9!1

77

100

56

71

50

121

80

1.:8

19!1

2114

581

infon ~8.t. ion, tiicy sugg est

.'.l

.

1..1ncd
-;:-ich p2.j·- ·off to spec inliz ctic, n &;:cl inc:rc

trad e uith in the An~~ an grou p.

Indi ces

co □ putcd

_;

,/_

fro~ Unit ed ~ati ons,
Stat istic al Appe ndix ,

pp. 89-9 2.

r.ote s !)ric., :: and cost
'iLc rn2.in body of th~.'.: pi.:b].icc.ti.o::-, al.so

El Grup o Andi no", ~it_ !_,
See als0 Ecbc ir L~ Dach a, "Vc:i czucl .;. y

---·

Tabl e I, p. 15 7,

b<isi c inpu ts
Prj_c e disp: n.-iti ;:is are clso m.!rk ed in such

as stee l ar-c.i chcn ic~ls .
the /indc an five lwvc plunG ed
It is at firs t sich t brc,a thte. king that

of e:wc t data on cost diffe r.:m ccs,
ahea d with thei r plzn s in spit e of the lack
of scal e, etc, The not-u nren sona l,lc
effe ctiv e rates of prot cctio ,,, ccono ::1ies

coun ter to _this ti.:,i di cy b

t~rnt 6e flcY. ::i.hi iity of the 'fr,-:w ty coup le·d

ons are more effic ient weap o:1s
with stron g policy ·-n.:> .1:ing coi::r:,en5.ty insti t~!:i
c stud ies.
in lrnnc. 1ling \incc rt.-in ty !:ii.-.:-.. t::.::1 0-c:on stnj_n
of
It may be notr:: d th2.t \·1hil c th>:! pric es

tilOSt

/,;1dc cn "JJ.c ht" indu strie s

nt r;oir1G c:-:ch r.n~c rate s, it is not
co1apc'.lYC unf:n \·~rn bly i-,itlt \10:·lc l pric es

-5-

di.sto.: tio,1s n<1y th-:'!n appc.ar otl:cnd sc.

11.

Sec Ed11in I~. Trt:~an ,

11

'.rh_e Europ~ nn Econon ic Co:·:,::iu nity:

of tbc likely sLnd.c g[,;lns fro.TI trade-c reation .

Trade CrcaU.0 :1

J;ut to the a;-,ru;.,e nt

the
th~t qu2~ti fic~tic n of such rains inevita bly has yielded Mea~rc results
follv.1 ini obs0j·,:c:c1.:ions cm1 b~ ma<le:

(a)

difforc nU'.S in cff2ctiv -2.

t
- rates of: protec tion among Ar:dean countr ies are lar.8c, and su~3cs
differe nces in costs greate r th,m those found elsc\:h ere; c1J1d (b)

it sJ-•ould

as o:w
be recalle d tiia t e;.-:prcs sions npproxi DaU.ng these ,-:el.far e t;ains have

cre~,t:i. on of t.bc c:01.::Lmn 1:iarkct .
-in 1r•ost Andean countr ies.

As already noted, these taxes are quite hJgh

In the case of the totc1l remova l

of

a tax on

welfa·_-,..
goods already h1porte d fron a country in the cor::roon narket , the
gain ccn be approx imated by:

2
1/2 [ (pq) • t • E]
vah1c of the
where t r.cp1ccs ents the ad w1lorel:l_ tax rcr:10ve d, B the absolu te
on the
price elastic ity of demand , and (pq) the value of cxpend itl\r0s

import ed good.
12.

Accord ing to data obtaine d from the Intern ationa l llonetai :y Fund,

tages
E.!.E.~ £d;!~of T,,'d(~ (ecvcr al issues ), the followi ng are the preccn
:?.1disc trad~
of intra-lm d~an ti:.:-:de: (exclud in~ Venezu <:la) in the total r..:orc~1.
of e,,ch cou:-itry :

E:-:n~r
----- -1:l'.J!s -65
lS'~ )_ .. r:,3
----- ·-----t<_:

BoU via

0,5

1.2

Li. 3

3.1

Chile

1.1

1.2

5.2

4.6

1.2

2,1

1:3

2.6

7.0

6.2

2,3

3,7

4 • 0,.

4.0

1;9

2.6

2. 8½

2.

2. 8½

3. 3~{

13.

n

the lale 19.'.i0 's.
These sche: nes h2v8 l1een 2cth ·2ly c1iscv ,se<l since

But it 1:,-;s 1inw2 cl w~ry diffi cult to plon fr~:

11

bord er intee ,ratio n" :i.n

:i.pat ,:inG count r.d:cs .
isola tion frol!l a full custo1 :1s union ar.10ng partic
\

14.

di!.'.t ribut: i.on is ?.::1bir;u ,us.
But the net effec t of intcr~ r.-itio n on inco~ 1c

15.

Sr:e BeJ.a Bal;i ss3,

/mieri cEt,

11

11

(forth co:,ii nG).

Integ ratio n and l~eso urce Alloc ~tion in Lat:i.n
ved
This ?HfCl ' also strca ses the gains to be achi~

<l Latin Amer ican indu strie s.
by grea ter comp etitio a arr.one; l'.lre?.<ly estah lisbc
on.
ry .'.'!nt1 l:2stc rn Europ ean Int<:('"1..r.ati
Eco~1 0:dc Theo
.
Se:c also TJbo:c Scitc, v~;l,y , ---·-- --- --- --- ·

---

(Lond on:

st ressj_ n~ the iaj_ns
Um.1in Uni·. icrsi ty Boot s, 1962) , for an an:1l ysis

n with in a ~fost crn Europ ean
to be achie ved Ly r,rcn tcr rJcotc cf: of comp etitio

conte xt.

c to LatJ.n Amer ica,
\:hilc th.:1t expe rienc e :is not dir.:.. ctly applic all.TI.

it is not irrelc v,,nL to the are:c, eithe r.

The Cnile nn and Colcr ::bi.m indu$CL~.::,s

1957.
of 1970 m:c. not far be-hin d. frc-~:c of Itnly in

It is curio us that, wit:l:: ln

-7•·

of ''national intc:gn1tic,~• 1 ;

16.

.cl

J;:h2:. w:lich ;:t best refers to a ~copoJ.itical

It co~ilcl be c1!.·~-.!c<l tl:cit p~ic12 cr.c! cc~:::s di.stc:~tic..ns arc so ereat

integration or :i.ts p-:istpo,·1ct::2:-:.~ ti:,t:-..1. c:.rter th~ dL,tortions are n'duced

dence on tthis 1w:i.n t.

started producir!e the cc:::::10~Uty :~n 1c-.rge s:::2le., cxi:,81:tin3 thE surplus to

world markets, withc~t th~ ncc1 f0r a rcgio~al g~oup . . But this rircument
negJ.ccts the s1:1.2lle:'._· risk invoJ.v2d in. pr:>(,ud.ng for a rcr,io:1al ~r.oup in
contr.:ast with producir.g fo:r the \-:o;:-lc.i 1 w.rk~t.
1

O:i. the other hand, _one

should be on gua!:cl against oH~:!'."ly optj_r.5.s tic ~"1n_~.'.:. engineer inc studj_es,

whibh alno.st \lH,.ys tt:r-n

0:.1=,

-~-.P~?~~, ·::o !1.:-.ve un.derestinatecl the cor.1petitlvc

disaclv2ntane of G0~:0stic ot:tpt.'t vi.~-0.-·1-Js tL~ ~::-:,rlc1 ,.1:1rl~et, or to have
overcsti1:mted tl!'.?! •.~>ility 0£ ~:!:a octi•;:it::..cs to 1:c2p up ,1ith productivity

incrcoses in the rest o·f tl~c wo-:'.'ld.

pp. 159-162.

Daehn nlro strr5ses the difficult ies to be expected in

negotiati ne co:::-iplernc ,1tati_on agre,:,i;1cn! :s fa'!:" ne:,.' industrie s, notine t:h,~ expe-

inflatfon ~ry cost-·rn~!?b cl!"ising fro1:1 j_ncfficic nt inpa-rt substitutf r,:1.

20.

And~~n cffortr to s~t up a re~ional cl=ctroni cs ind~stry (moi~ly

w:l.th the l!e::d.can liajcstic group, \-,}dch in return for a r.-d.nority int:21:T,st

p. 49.

21.

The 1;:ulU.pJ.:. i.cation of cont!"2cts rn,i()ng Ancle211 cntn~prcn eun; cl1:ci·tg

Paul i"-l. Roscastc:i .n-I(odan)

11

1lultinatiC J1.c,l :;:nvestne: nt in th.:: rrz,:~.2,;o:k

Latin /ir.1c.!d.u, (Round 'fable, Intcr·-,\ne ric'"n Developm ent D;.nk, Bo~ota,

• _-1 1rirn
•
Ii,
;oo, p, 3,\
11pr1
Co 1 omb in,

-

22.

There

\UcS

1
talk of joint /mC:ean participa tion in the 1970 Uorlcl ~ E.ir

at Osaka, Japan.
23.

For a

This idea, hrn,;evcr ,,.-was abandoned .

more detnilc<l discussi.on

of the issues raised by direct foreign

investncm t in Latin i'.r::erican de•,elop2e nt see ny ''Dirt!Ct Forei:~n In-..restme nt

in Latin A1,1c.rica", in Chzirles P. 1:indlebc r2cr, Editor, The Intern2ti onal
1·
I ~1. P ress, 10.·,·o).
Tin e -.,
• d ~e::
,
. 1. (C ar;-1or1
~ ••.•
Cor.porat.J.0:

21._

Data obtained frorJ U.S. D:!partE:e nt of Cor.::ncrcc, Survey of Cu!'.rcnt

Business, Octob~r 19G9.

TI1c 196t book val~o of all U.S. diro~t investmen ts

in thost! thrcci counti::i('.~; is put 2t $2.3 ti.Dion.
(book w:J.u(~) :i.n 1iJnin;,; .:1n<l Sn0ll

l!ii_:;

Of ~11 U.S. dlrL~ct: invcst:·,,.--,_:t:;

in L,Jtjn /,r.1cr.ic2~ 72 per cent ;ire in

-9-

.,,1

nnd Peru r,rc.. ch.1ring 1950--68 at
1

26.

nnnunl

rr:LC!

of 5.5 per ce:nt.

Accordir:~ to the: J.nte:rn.:itio:,:d. :!onetary Fu,,d, Dir,~clic:;'. of T::.:de,

Ll1e recent eco~raphical percentage structure of Andean forc~~n trad~

------ ----- --~----. --

.. _____ h:r:,cn: ti, __ ( c • j ,_ f. ) ___
1 s• :.
1-.,, () ;:J - ~•, /

J. ~ t1 1- ~~\ :J

-------- -----~
1 /:

'"~ •:

.-:\

U.S.A.

l1l.

7

38.3

3C1, 3

t,3. 2

!;2,.S

l,O. 8

United Kin 0 c!o:.:1

10.11

8.9

9.7

6.5

5.9

5.2

5.1

6.7

7. !;

3.9

t,. 5

5.1

25.6

27 .5

28.3

21.8

1 r,.,; .:.J
r
...

20,7

7.1

7.7

7.11

11. 7

1'1.2

1/1,9

10.1

11.0

10.9

13.0

13.6

13.3

J" 2. p.211

European Cc.,:.;-.,:on lfarket
Latin ,u:,erica

Others

an<l other LAFTA countries than wiLhin the group.

nut tlwy also reveal

the larce and growinc deficit bet\1e:cn the ll.!1de2.11s a-.-id the rest of L,\FTt.,
which has troubled the subregion,

27.

See Roclrieo Botero, La Coml!nidad Econo1:iicn Caribc f, Ai~_clj_n~ ~liogota:

Ecliciones 'fcrccr ;:runclo, 1967).

Sec also 11arcos Kaplan E., 1~roliler::1os

.,

,

.

.

.

..

clel ilesan:ollo y de J.2 1nte 1;raCl.Od <1e ,-,merica L2:..:in-3-.

(,..... .
.
1~ditorial de la
'

Universi<la<l de Chile,_ Escucla de D8i:ccho de Valparaiso, -1967),

z,t3.

Consider in this licht the asyr::metr:i.cal reactions of the United

States and Ucstern Eu .. op2. to increases and dccrcnscs in th12 prices of
coff ce, copper, textiles, etc.

Aicl fJ.ows .( r0i:1 the s tronr.; to th~ '7cak

can then be vi·cwccl ns p,n:t:i.;_11 co:i·,pc.ns2.tion for· tr,:de csyr:.'\,;trics.

'i'

- ,....,-,_

I

r;;;d

r. j~.

Cr-if fin, C',·'.::.''?_Tdo In tern ,,cione1l

LO

y

Po_J JU c~1.2_J2J:_~-~~~~!3}L~

be a p~sitiv: amo~c~), then:

is-ti,2 cr,ndition for true reciprocity, uh12:;::c t:L'3 q·'s rcprC'.se:nt c;u::ntif:1;_:;
ii:,1portcod :i:r.om the re~ion (subscript 1) ani4 q·.rnntities cxpo::_·ted to the

for~ul& is proposed as a guide for true reciprocity.

31.

lt has been sug8csted, especially by Paul N, Uosenst0Jn-Rodan, that

the /,1:cle<'!n countries at their first integration efforts nvo:i.<l a ccr:~::on

extcnrnl tur:i.ff, ess,~rit1ally crc:.1tin3
acl lJoc co::::,1-~oentat:i.on azreer:euts.

a fre2 -trade

zone coupled Hith

If th.:! letter are well plcnmed,

for P<.:ru c>nd Venezue:la.

32.

Pa;.il lJ. Iloi,enf;te:!.n-:-Rod,:n,

11

liuJ_tinational Invest~ent iu the F:i.·,~w~:-

uork of L.:t:Ln Amer:i.cnn I:itezrat:ion,1'

Op. Ci!,, p. 33.

